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In recent years, many small wineries have taken advantage of the Internet
as a sales tool, creating challenges to existing state laws that prohibit the direct
shipment of alcohol to consumers. Were these businesses shipping nearly any
other product, the constraints of the "dormant Commerce Clause" of the federal
constitution would prevent states from regulating such transactions.' The
Twenty-first Amendment, however, grants the states unique powers when the
object of regulation is alcoholic beverages.2 The extent to which this grant
creates an exception to the dormant Commerce Clause, along with the manner
in which that exception may be used, has been the subject of two recent cases
in the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. In Bridenbaugh v. Freeman- Wilson,3 the
Seventh Circuit upheld an Indiana law prohibiting the direct shipment of
alcohol to Indiana consumers by anyone in the business of selling alcohol in
another state or country. Yet shortly thereafter in Bainbridge v. Turner,4 the
Eleventh Circuit explicitly rejected the Seventh Circuit's approach and greatly
limited the scope of Florida's regulatory powers under the Twenty-first
Amendment. This circuit split has important implications for both oenophiles
and federalists, and may occasion a Supreme Court decision that clearly shows
the effect on national policy of that Court's changing composition.
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2005. The author would like to thank David Sweet for all of his
suggestions and edits during the writing of this case note.
1. The Commerce Clause states that "Congress shall have power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... " U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
The thrust of the "dormant Commerce Clause" is that this explicit grant of power to Congress implicitly
limits the states' powers in the same sphere. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); Michael E.
Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1986).
2. "The transportation or importation into any state, territory, or possession of the United States for
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
3. 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1002 (2001).
4. 311 F.3d 1104 (1lth Cir. 2002).
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I. THE STATE OF THE LAW
Three Supreme Court decisions currently guide the interaction of the
Twenty-first Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause.5 In Bacchus
6Imports, Ltd v. Dias, the Court examined a Hawaii wholesale liquor tax from
which several beverages produced within the state were exempted. Justice
White, writing for the Court, found that those tax exemptions violated the
Commerce Clause, as they "had both the purpose and effect of discriminating
in favor of local products." 7 He then addressed whether the discriminatory
legislation was "saved" by Hawaii's Twenty-first Amendment powers. Justice
White concluded that the Amendment did not completely repeal the Commerce
Clause as it relates to alcohol; despite the fact that the Twenty-first Amendment
was enacted much later than the Commerce Clause, the interests reflected by
the two clauses must be considered in harmony with each other. Only if "the
principles underlying the Twenty-first Amendment are sufficiently implicated
by the exemption" would the constraints of the Commerce Clause be
superseded.8 Exactly what those underlying principles are is a question left
mostly unanswered, other than by an offhand reference to temperance. What is
clear is that the "mere economic protectionism" seen as motivating Hawaii's
tax system is not a valid interest, as the Court denied the exemptions a basis in
the Amendment's grant of powers.
9
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, dissented from
the Court's decision in Bacchus, disputing that an inquiry into the purposes
underlying the Amendment was necessary.' 0 Based on the actual text of the
Amendment, Justice Stevens argued, an absolute ban on imported alcohol
would be constitutional; thus, a state ought also to be able to engage in a lesser
form of discrimination. 1" Accordingly, it is not even necessary to determine
whether a state law violates the Commerce Clause prior to justifying it under
the Twenty-first Amendment.
Five years later, in Healy v. Beer Institute,12 the Court struck down a
Connecticut statute that required out-of-state beer shippers to certify that the
prices they charged to Connecticut wholesalers were no higher than the prices
they were charging in bordering states.13 Following Bacchus, the majority first
5. For an overview of the historical evolution of Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence as it
relates to the dormant Commerce Clause, see Matthew J. Patterson, Note, A Brewing Debate: Alcohol
Direct Shipment Laws and the Twenty-first Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 761.
6. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
7. Id. at 273.
8. Id. at 275.
9. Id. at 276.
10. Id. at 287 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at288.
12. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
13. In Healy, the Court explicitly overruled Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S.
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examined whether the statute violated the Commerce Clause: It concluded the
statute had "the undeniable effect of controlling commercial activity occurring
wholly outside the boundary of the state." 14 After finding this violation of the
Commerce Clause, the Court quickly disposed of any Twenty-first Amendment
issues by holding that the extraterritorial effects of the statute precluded its
justification under the Amendment.' 5 Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion,
agreeing that the statute was unconstitutional on Commerce Clause grounds,
but only because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce. 6 He
disputed the majority's assertion that extraterritorial effects alone always
violate the Commerce Clause, as such a position would invalidate numerous
other state laws. 17
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor,
dissented. These three again argued that Twenty-first Amendment analysis was
dispositive, making the Commerce Clause discussion unnecessary.18
Acknowledging that the states' regulatory power must co-exist with
Congressional power to regulate commerce, the dissenters saw the Twenty-first
Amendment as creating an exception to the Commerce Clause within which the
states have virtually complete control over liquor importation, sale, and
distribution. 19
The following year, the Court decided North Dakota v. United States,
upholding a state law implementing a labeling and reporting system for the sale
of alcohol to two Air Force bases over which the state and the federal
government shared concurrent jurisdiction.20 Although the Court focused much
of its attention on issues of intergovernmental immunity, it also considered the
35 (1966), which had upheld a New York price-affirmation statute. This was a choice it had declined to
make three years earlier, in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476
U.S. 573 (1986). The statute at issue in Seagram had been "retrospective," tying maximum prices to
what had been charged in other states during the previous month; Brown-Forman, on the other hand,
struck down a "prospective" statute that tied prices in New York to what would be charged elsewhere
during the upcoming month. "In the interest of removing any lingering doubt about the constitutional
validity of affirmation statutes," the Healy Court decided to remove that distinction, holding that the
"inherent practical extraterritorial effect of regulating prices in other States" made price affirmation
statutes generally invalid. 491 U.S. at 343.
As Seagram was still good law at the time Brown-Forman was decided, Justices Stevens, White,
and Rehnquist dissented. 476 U.S. at 586. Justice White, however, joined the majority in Healy in
overruling Seagram, thus switching positions with Justice O'Connor (who was part of the Brown-
Forman majority).
14. Id. at 337.
15. Id. at 342.
16. Id. at 344 (Scalia, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 345. Justice Scalia argued that even a "rudimentary" law capping the maximum retail
prices for cases of beer would be vulnerable under the majority's analysis, as such a law would entice
out-of-state consumers to drive across state lines to purchase beverages. Such reasoning, he warned,
could cause this area ofjurisprudence to "degenerate into disputes over degree of economic effect."
18. Id. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
19. Id. at349.
20. 495 U.S. 423 (1990).
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Twenty-first Amendment question. Writing for a four-member plurality, Justice
Stevens stated:
The two North Dakota regulations fall within the core of the State's power under
the Twenty-first Amendment. In the interest of promoting temperance, ensuring
orderly market conditions, and raising revenue, the State has established a
comprehensive system for the distribution of liquor within its borders. That system
is unquestionably legitimate.
2 1
Thus, though not adopting the "underlying principles" analysis he objected
to in Bacchus, Justice Stevens shed some light on what those principles might
be. Justice Scalia wrote separately to voice his disagreement with the plurality's
reasoning on whether principles of intergovernmental immunity were violated
by the regulations. Despite this disagreement, he argued that the regulations
were saved by the Twenty-first Amendment, which does not exempt the federal
government from the reach of the states' regulatory abilities (as long as the
22regulations do not discriminate against the federal government). The
remaining four members concurred in upholding the reporting requirement but
found the labeling requirement to interfere with intergovernmental immunity to
an extent not allowed by the Twenty-first Amendment. However, because they
argued that an area of concurrent jurisdiction was not within a state for
purposes of the Amendment, they did not reach the question of the extent of the
states' powers to regulate the importation of alcohol.
23
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
It is against this background that two recent cases came before Circuit
Courts of Appeals. The Seventh Circuit case, Bridenbaugh v. Freeman- Wilson,
involved a challenge to an Indiana law forbidding the direct shipment of
alcohol to consumers by "any person in the business of selling alcoholic
beverages in another state or country." 24 As in most states, Indiana's alcohol
distribution system has three tiers: Separate permits are required for
manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers. In this case, several Indiana
consumers challenged the law requiring a wholesaler's permit for direct
purchases from out-of-state sellers, on the ground that the requirement violated
the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating in favor of local wineries.
26
21. Idat432.
22. Id. at 448 (Scalia, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
24. 227 F.3d 848, 849 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1002 (2001) (quoting IND. CODE.
§ 7.1-5-11-1.5(a) (2000)).
25. Id. at 851.
26. In his opinion, Judge Easterbrook acknowledged the existence of the following problem: Out-
of-state vendors might not be eligible for permits required to sell to Indiana residents. Accordingly, as
Indiana also has laws against purchasing alcohol from unlicensed dealers, a victory in this case would
still not have made it legal for plaintiff consumers to make the purchases they desired. Judge
Easterbrook declined to hold that this conundrum rendered plaintiffs' claim moot. As a practical matter,
though, only the direct shipping prohibition was before the court, as plaintiffs did not have standing to
Vol. 21:547, 2003
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Claiming that the promotion of temperance is the only core concern of the
Twenty-first Amendment, plaintiffs argued that the Amendment could not
rescue the regulations from the Commerce Clause violation. Defendants
countered that North Dakota and Healy left room for other considerations, such
as providing orderly market conditions and raising revenue. 27 Judge
Easterbrook stated that defendants' view had more precedential support but
claimed that both sides missed the real issue: "[O]ur guide is the text and
history of the Constitution, not the "purposes" or "concerns" that may or may
not have animated its drafters. Objective indicators supply the context for § 2
[of the Amendment]; suppositions about mental processes are
unilluminating."
28
Having established its interpretative principles, the court then reviewed the
pre-Prohibition history of alcohol shipment regulations, focusing on the fact
that the Commerce Clause had prevented even dry states from prohibiting the
importation and resale of alcohol that remained in its original package. In
response to this, Congress passed the Webb-Kenyon Act in 1913, using its
Commerce Clause power to forbid the violation of state prohibition laws. After
Webb-Kenyon, then, states were no longer less able to regulate the importation
of alcohol than its domestic production.
29
Judge Easterbrook then asserted that the Twenty-first Amendment
effectively returned to this approach after Prohibition, incorporating the states'
prohibitions into federal law and closing the loophole through which the
dormant Commerce Clause protected direct interstate shipments. 30 This
approach puts in-state and out-of-state shipments on the same playing field:
Although imports can be banned completely, the power of absolute prohibition
does not imply the lesser power of allowing imports on discriminatory terms, as
did the Hawaii statute struck down in Bacchus.
31
Since "Indiana insists that every drop of liquor pass through its three-tiered
system and be subjected to taxation," the court held that the regulation in
question is in no way discriminatory. 32 No matter where the alcohol originates,
a permit is required to deliver it to Indiana consumers. As the plaintiffs did not
(and could not) challenge the apparent inability of those outside the state to
receive permits, 33 the Indiana system was found to be constitutionally
permissible.
challenge the other statutes. Id. at 850.
27. Id. at 851.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 852.
30. Id. at 853.
31. Id. Ironically, one Frank H. Easterbrook argued the appellants' case in Bacchus. 468 U.S. at
264.
32. Id.
33. See supra note 26.
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The Eleventh Circuit faced a similar question about direct shipment laws in
Bainbridge v. Turner.34 Like Indiana, Florida has a three-tiered alcohol
distribution system requiring separate permits for manufacturers, distributors,
and vendors (which are generally mutually exclusive categories). However, in-
state wineries can take advantage of an exception that allows them to apply for
vendor's permits as well; with such a permit, they can ship directly to
consumers, provided they use their own vehicles (not common carriers) to do
so.35 A group of consumers and out-of-state wineries challenged this exception
on the ground that it discriminated against out-of-state wineries by restricting
eligibility for special vendor permits to wineries with a sales outlet contiguous
to licensed manufacturing premises-thus necessarily in the state of Florida.
36
Writing for the court, Judge Tjoflat applied the Bacchus test, first ruling
that the Florida statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause by facially
discriminating against out-of-state economic interests. 37 By directly shipping
their products to consumers, in-state wineries can avoid the hassle and expense
of operating through the standard three-tiered system; out-of-state wineries
must contend with the price mark-ups that inevitably result from utilizing that
regulatory system, putting their products at a competitive disadvantage relative
to wines made in-state. 38 Because a nondiscriminatory alternative-namely,
allowing out-of-state wineries to apply for licenses--could also accomplish the
state's goals of raising revenue and controlling the flow of alcohol, the
Commerce Clause violation would be sufficient to strike down the statute were
its subject something other than alcohol.39
The court then inquired whether the Twenty-first Amendment could rescue
the Florida statute. Judge Tjoflat argued that the Amendment does not actually
alter the Commerce Clause, but merely makes violations of state liquor laws
also Constitutional violations; as those state laws might themselves be
unconstitutional otherwise, the Amendment is treated as if it gives states new
powers.40 Still, the Amendment does not give states free rein to regulate
alcoholic beverages. Only if a core concern of the Amendment is sufficiently
implicated by the law at issue will an exception to the dormant Commerce
Clause restriction be recognized-the state has the burden of showing that "it
genuinely needs the law to effectuate its proffered core concern. '41 The court
did hold, however, that the Amendment removes the requirement that no
34. 311 F.3d 1104 (i1 th Cir. 2002).
35. Id. at 1106.
36. Id. at 1107 n.6.
37. Id. at 1109.
38. Id. at 1107.
39. Id. at 1110.




nondiscriminatory alternative be available.42 Judge Tjoflat also recognized two
other restrictions on the scope of the powers granted by the Amendment:
Following Healy, the law cannot directly regulate extraterritorial commerce;
following Bacchus, the law cannot have mere economic protectionism as its
motivation.
43
Florida argued that its interests in protecting minors, ensuring orderly
markets for the sale of alcohol, and raising revenue fell within the scope of the
Amendment's core concerns. 44 The court rejected the first two motives as
inadequate. Despite having held that a lack of nondiscriminatory alternatives
did not have to be shown, Judge Tjoflat stated that Florida could still protect
against sales to underage consumers by requiring the same licensing
requirements for out-of-state wineries as for those in the state.45 The state's
desire to "ensur[e] orderly markets" was similarly dismissed as not
encompassing efforts to exclude out-of-state firms from the Florida market
46through discriminatory measures.
As for the third state interest, the court ruled that more evidence was
needed to determine whether the discriminatory statute was necessary to
Florida's legitimate interest in raising revenue. Again effectively contradicting
its prior holding that lack of nondiscriminatory alternatives did not have to be
shown by the state, the majority held that Florida had to show not only the
promotion of a core concern, but also that the facially discriminatory statute is
"necessary to effectuate" that concern.47 That is, Florida was required to
demonstrate that it could not apply the same system of taxation to out-of-state
firms that it used to raise revenue within the state; this narrow issue was its one
remaining hope of justifying the statute. The case was remanded to the district
48court for resolution of this remaining question.
The dissent, written by Judge Roney, did not contest the analytic
framework employed by the majority, but disagreed with the conclusion that
core concerns of the Twenty-first Amendment were not sufficiently implicated.
He argued that the regulatory measures used to control in-state businesses
would be less effective when applied to out-of-staters, as the majority
suggested could be done. For example, the threat of losing a license to operate
in Florida provides much more incentive for an in-state winery than it would
for one located elsewhere. 49 Judge Roney did not discuss the possible existence
of other nondiscriminatory alternatives, thus implying that their absence did not
42. Id. at 1115 n.17.
43. Id. at 1112.
44. Id. at 1114-15.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1115.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1115-16.
49. Id. at 1116 (Roney, J., dissenting).
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have to be shown by the state.
III. THE SCOPE OF DISAGREEMENT
The majority in Bainbridge explicitly considered and rejected the analysis
conducted by Judge Easterbrook in Bridenbaugh. In one respect, the Eleventh
Circuit actually read the Twenty-first Amendment more expansively than did
the Seventh Circuit, holding that § 2 ruled out only "mere economic
protectionism"; in Bridenbaugh, the Amendment was read to include a
nondiscrimination principle carried over from the Webb-Kenyon Act.50 Thus, a
facially discriminatory statute regulating the importation of alcohol would
necessarily be struck down in the Seventh Circuit but would have a chance at
surviving in the Eleventh Circuit if the state could show a necessary relation to
effectuating a core concern of the Amendment-that is, a motivation beyond
mere protectionism.
However, this disagreement masks a more fundamental way in which the
two approaches diverge. In Bridenbaugh, Judge Easterbrook addressed the
Commerce Clause issue only briefly before inquiring whether Indiana's statute
was a valid exercise of its Twenty-first Amendment powers. Rather than focus
on the Commerce Clause and treat the Amendment as providing a sort of
affirmative defense against some Commerce Clause violations, Judge
Easterbrook construed the Amendment as a positive grant of power to the
states, enabling them to forbid the importation of alcohol or regulate it to the
same extent as they regulate its domestic sources. Only regulations that
discriminate against out-of-state sources overreach the states' power.
This approach is justified, Judge Easterbrook argued, by the history and text
of the Constitution, an assertion which drew criticism from Judge Tjoflat.
Though the Seventh Circuit decision did not blatantly ignore the governing
Supreme Court precedents, it applied their holdings selectively. For example,
whereas Judge Easterbrook saw only a nondiscrimination principle as binding
precedent in his interpretation of the Amendment, Judge Tjoflat argued that the
"core concerns" framework from Bacchus had to be followed in deciding such
cases. 51 Implicit within the "core concerns" approach is the continued
analytical priority of the Commerce Clause; implicating one of those concerns
can "rescue" a statute from a Commerce Clause violation, meaning that a
reviewing court must ascertain any such violation before addressing the
Twenty-first Amendment issues.
It is this disagreement over the form of analysis necessary that ultimately
leads to much of the substantive differences in the positions of the two Circuits.





either of these two judges seems to believe. The holding in Bacchus did indeed
rely on a determination of the purposes to be served by the Hawaii liquor tax-
economic protectionism was held to be an illegitimate motive-but the Court
failed to articulate a clear test for valid motives. Subsequently, in Healy and
North Dakota, the Court addressed Twenty-first Amendment issues without
relying upon the "core concerns" framework, although North Dakota did
include some mention of the state's motivations. 52 A plausible case could
therefore be made that the Court has abandoned the "core concerns" test, but
the lack of an explicit disavowal of that test leaves the question open for
debate.
In the end, it may be the latest changes in the Court's membership that
determine how the Court resolves any such future case. Of the justices who
decided Bacchus in 1984, only the three dissenters are still on the bench.53
Presumably, those three would hold to their original view that states may enact
even legislation that discriminates against imported alcohol.54 Justice Scalia
wrote separate concurrences in Healy and North Dakota; in both opinions, he
mentioned only a nondiscrimination principle as a limitation on the states'
Twenty-first Amendment powers. 55 Though he never explicitly addresses the
"core concerns" test, his approach might very well be based on the same logic
employed by Judge Easterbrook-a focus on the text and history of the
Amendment itself. Justice Kennedy joined the opinion of the Court in Healy,
and Justice Brennan's opinion in North Dakota.56 However, even if those votes
were to be interpreted as support for the "core concerns" framework (an
uncertain inference at best), the four most recently appointed Justices have yet
to voice their opinions on the issue.
Accordingly, even if Judge Tjoflat was correct in claiming that Judge
Easterbrook disregarded a prescribed test by not applying the "core concerns"
framework, it would only take one of those four new Justices to validate the
Seventh Circuit's approach. If, for example, Justice Thomas were to concur
with Justice Scalia's methodology, the majority of the Court would have clearly
52. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Despite the listing of North Dakota's motivations in
implementing their alcohol regulations, Justice Stevens's focus is clearly on the regulatory powers
granted by the Amendment, not the subjective intentions of the legislators attempting to utilize those
powers. Such a powers-based analysis is consistent with the position taken by Justice Stevens in his
Bacchus dissent.
53. For a listing of the presiding Justices at the time of Bacchus and today, see Members of the
Supreme Court of the United States, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf
(last viewed March 29, 2003).
54. 468 U.S. at 286 (Stevens, J., dissenting). At the same time, it is also possible that the Bacchus
and Healy dissenters would change their approaches and follow precedent out of concern for stare
decisis-the brief discussion of various state interests by the North Dakota plurality could be seen as a
step in the direction of accepting the Bacchus framework. However, the lack of a clear test for defining
state interests, as well as the lack of any obvious reliance interest based on the "core concerns"
framework, make this possibility less likely.
55. 491 U.S. at 344 (Scalia, J., concurring); 495 U.S. at 448 (Scalia, J., concurring).
56. 491 U.S. at 325; 495 U.S. at 448 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
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abandoned the "core concerns" approach. In such a scenario, states would only
be prevented from implementing a regulatory scheme that discriminated against
importation of out-of-state alcohol. Furthermore, an even more aggressively
pro-state outcome is possible should two additional Justices side with the three
Bacchus dissenters and hold that even discriminatory statutes are permitted. It
is not clear that Bainbridge would have been decided differently under either of
these analyses, but the reasoning in Bridenbaugh that Judge Tjoflat criticized
would end up appearing rather prescient. Judge Easterbrook gambled by
narrowly interpreting recent precedent. It remains to be seen whether the
Supreme Court will call his bluff.
